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SECURITIES
COMMENTARY
THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S APPROACH TO THE "IN
CONNECTION WITH" REQUIREMENT OF RULE
lob-5
Barbara Black*
Not every fraud involving a security is securities fraud for
the purpose of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934l and its Rule lob-5 (the rule).2 The rule requires that the
fraud be "in connection with" a purchase or sale of a se~urity.~
In its 1971 decision, Superintendent of Insurance of New York
u. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,' the Supreme Court held that a
Rule lob-5 claim was stated where the fraud involved the misappropriation of the proceeds of a sale of securities, because the
seller "suffered an injury as a result of deceptive practices
touching its sale of securities as an investor."~ubsequently, the
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law.
15 U.S.C. 8 78j(b) (1982).
17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1986).
Rule lob-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the USE of nay
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the 4 or of nny
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artiEce to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not mislendig, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection d t h the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C9.R. 3 240.10b-5 (1986).
The "in connection with" language also requires that the plnintiff in n private action
must be a purchaser or seller of securities. Blue Chip Stamps v. h h o r Drug Store3,421
U.S. 723 (1975).
404 U.S. 6 (1971).
404 U.S. at 12-13. The facts of Bankers Life are complicated but well known. The
purchaser of all the stock of hlanhattan Casualty 60.paid for the stock d t h the pro-
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necessary connection was often described as a "de minimis touch
testne and, prior to 1984, the "in connection with" requirement
was not generally viewed as posing a significant obstacle in establishing a securities fraud case.
The Second Circuit, however, in its 1984 decision, Chemical
Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,' made it clear that something
~
district courts in
more than "de minimis" was r e q ~ i r e d .Some
the Second Circuit read Chemical Bank as requiring that the
misrepresentation relate to the security's value in order to satisfy the "in connection with" req~irement.~
However, SEC o.
Drysdale Securities Corp.,1° decided in the Second Circuit's
1985-86 term, made it clear that the misrepresentation need not
involve the investment characteristics of the securities in order
to be sufficiently connected to the securities transaction. Nevertheless, what "in connection with" requires remains a source of
uncertainty. Since 1984, the "in connection with" requirement
has been described both as "broad"" and as "stringent."12
Courts address the "in connection with" requirement in the
context of two different issues. First, the lack of the requisite
connection goes to the question of federal jurisdiction. Thus,
even though there may be a security involved, the alleged misconduct may not have occurred in a securities transaction.
Rather, properly analyzed, the plaintiffs allegations consist of
common-law fraud claims involving a breach of fiduciary duty or
commercial fraud and, hence, are outside the scope of federal
securities fraud jurisdiction. In this situation, the "in connection
with" requirement is necessary to limit Rule lob-5 jurisdiction
ceeds of the sale of the corporation's own treasury bonds. The Supreme Court held that
the plaintiff, representing the corporation, could bring a Rule lob-5 action as seller of
the bonds, since it was defrauded by the misappropriation of the proceeds.
E.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1028 (6th Cir. 1979)
("the alleged deceptive practice only need be 'touching' the sale of securities") (citing
Banker's Life. 404 U.S. a t 12-13).
' 726 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1984).
See id. at 943. ("The Act and Rule impose liability for a proscribed act in connection with the purchase or sale of a security; it is not sufficient to allege that a defendant
has committed a proscribed act in a transaction of which the pledge of a security is a
part.") See text accompanying notes 17-23 infra.
a See, e.g., SEC v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 295,297 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), reu'd,
785 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986). See also notes 44-49 and accompanying text infra.
lo 785 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986).
I' United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1033 (2d Cir. 1986).
" Crummere v. Smith Barney, 624 F. Supp. 751, 754 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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so that the rule does not encompass all of common-law fraud.
Second, even though there is a securities transaction that is
more closely linked to the fraud, nevertheless, the court may determine that the fraud did not cause the injury complained of,
and therefore it was not "in connection with" the securities
transaction. The Second Circuit analyzes this requirement in
terms of "loss causation"13 while other circuits use the traditional "proximate cause."" Only private plaintiffs need to establish "loss causation." The requirement stems from Rule lob-5's
resemblance to the common law tort of deceit1=and the courts'
perception that it is necessary to limit damages.Is In these cases,
the fraud may have induced the stock purchase, but it did not
relate to the security's value, or was not otherwise foreseeably
related to an injury arising from a securities transaction and,
therefore, is not actionable under Rule lob-5.
Thus, while the "in connection with" and causation requirements are analytically distinct, they are related to each other,
and discussion of the first requirement may merge with discussion of the second. As the securities transaction becomes more
removed from the fraudulent conduct, it becomes less likely that
the damages suffered resulted from the securities transaction.
This Commentary examines the evolution of the "in connection
with" requirement within the Second Circuit, focusing on cases
decided in the 1985-86 term. It attempts to illustrate the direction the Circuit has taken in dealing with complex issues of securities fraud.

I. THEChemical Bank

AND Drysdale

DECISIONS

In Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,17 four banks
made a series of loans to Frigitemp Corp. and its wholly owned
subsidiary, Elsters, Inc. As part of one transaction, Frigitemp
pledged the stock of Elsters. The banks alleged that they enIs See Schlick v. Penn-Die Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Ci. 1974). See ako
notes 73-75 and accompanying text infra.
l4 See, e.g., Huddleston v
. Herman & hlaclean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981), mediFed, 495 U.S. 375 (1983).
6 L Loss. SECURITIES
REGULATION3880 (1969).
" See Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234,239 (2d Cir. 1975); Globus v. Law
Research Serv., 418 F.2d 1276,1292 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 US. 913 (1970); f i t
v. Fashion Park, Inc, 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965).
l7 726 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1984).
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tered into the transaction in reliance on Frigitemp's financial
statements certified by the defendant, the corporation's auditor
Arthur Andersen & Co. (Andersen), which materially misstated
Frigitemp's financial health. The district court denied Andersen's motion to dismiss for lack of federal jurisdiction.lS It found
that the pledge of the Elsters stock was a sale of the stock and,
relying on Bankers Life, that the alleged fraud occurred "in connection with" the pledge.
The Second Circuit agreed with the district court that a
pledge of stock was a sale of securities. It found, however, that
there was no connection between the fraud and the pledge.
Judge Friendly did not view these loans as securities transactions, but rather as commercial transactions, which happened to
involve the pledge of securities. Thus, the court emphasized the
incidental nature of the pledge transaction and questioned
whether any significant advantage to the banks' position was
achieved by the pledge.19
Subsequently, some district courts in the Second Circuit
read Chemical Bank as requiring that the misrepresentation relate to the security's value in order to satisfy the "in connection
~ ~ the Chemical Bank panel emphawith" r e q ~ i r e m e n t .While
sized that no alleged misstatement related to the Elsters common stock,2l this served to underscore the court's view that the
pledge was an incidental and insignificant transaction. Judge
Friendly demonstrated the attenuated connection between the
alleged misstatements about Frigitemp and the pledge of Elsters
stock by describing the banks' argument in terms of causation: if
the accounting firm had not made misstatements about Frigitemp, the banks would not have made the loans to Frigitemp
and Elsters and hence would not have taken the securities as
collateral for the loan. He stated, however, that "[s]uch 'but-for'
causation is not enough."22

'" 552 F. Supp. 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
'* 726 F.2d at 943 n.21.
See SEC v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 295,297 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd, 785
F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986); Crummere v. Smith Barney, 646 F. Supp. 751, 765 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); Moran v. Kidder Peabody, 617 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Kimmco Energy
Corp. v. Jones, 603 F. Supp. 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See also notes 43-49 and nccompnnying
text infra.
726 F.2d at 943.
Id. "[Tlhe Banks' 'but-for' allegation merely established 'transaction causation'
. they have failed to establish the 'loss causation' necessary for a legally sufficient

..
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It would be anomalous to hold that commercial bank loans procured
by fraud are generally not within 3 10(b) and Rule lob-5, but thnt
they become so, even though of a sort that no one would have considered to constitute a security, if collateralized with a security, although
no misrepresentation was made with respect to the latter.=

In Securities and Exchange Commission u. Drysdale Securities Gorp.:' the SEC sued the broker-dealer, three of its principals, and a partner in the accounting firm that prepared financial statements for Drysdale. The SEC claimed that the
accountant prepared financial statements that concealed the
firm's substantial capital deficit. Drysdale was in the government securities business in both the cash market and the repurchase agreements (repos) market. The latter constituted two
types of transactions: Drysdale engaged in sale and repurchase
agreements (repos) which it structured as sales of the securities
by Drysdale subject to an agreement to repurchase them a t a
fixed price at a later date. Drysdale also engaged in reverse sale
and purchase agreements (reverse repos), which it structured as
purchases by Drysdale of the securities subject to an agreement
to resell them at a fixed price at a later date. The SEC did not
contend that the repos or reverse repos mere securities.
The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the
case was governed by Chemical
According to the district
court, Chemical Bank required a direct link between the rnisrepresentation and the securities involved in the transaction, a connection that was absent
Because the misstatements did
not relate to the value of the government securities themselves,
but to the financial position of the firm, the court held that the
alleged fraud was not "in connection with" the purchase or sale
of ~ecurities.2~
The Second Circuit re~ersed.2~
In its opinion, the court concentrated on distinguishing Chemical Bank. The court did not
accept the defendants' view that Drysdale's rep0 was the same
claim under 5 lob and Rule lob-5." Id. at n.23. See also text accompanying notes 33-35
infra.
726 F.2d at 944.
785 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986).
" 606 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.1985).
Id. at 299.
" Id.
785 F.2d at 38.
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as the short-term collateralized loan in Chemical Bank. Unlike
the traditional collateralized loan involved in Chemical Bank, in
these rep0 and reverse rep0 transactions, the holder of the securities was free to deal in them. In a reverse rep0 transaction, the
firm's obligation to resell the securities to the other party depended upon the firm's financial ability to repurchase identical
securities in the marketplace, since the common practice was to
sell the securities upon entering the reverse rep0 agreement.
Similarly, the firm's obligation in a rep0 transaction to repurchase the securities a t a later date depended more on the securities' appreciation in value than it otherwise would have, given
the firm's insolvency. Finally, the securities held by Drysdale
were assets available for satisfaction of its debts and thus could
be seized by creditors. Hence, what this arrangement was worth
to the party on the other side of the transaction depended substantially on the financial health of Drysdale. Therefore, unlike
Chemical Bank, misrepresentations about the financial health of
the company were closely linked to the transfers of the securities
involved.28The Second Circuit concluded that:
[ulnlike a pledge of securities in a traditional secured financing, in
which the financial health of the lender is irrelevant to the value of
both the pledged securities and the pledge itself, [Drysdale's] financial
strength was essential to the value received by the other party in a
securities transacti~n.~~

The Second Circuit took a different approach in Manufac~l
turers Hanover Trust Co. v. Drysdale Securities C ~ r p . Manufacturers Hanover was an action for private damages involving
the same defendants and allegations as in the SEC action
against Drysdale. The bank obtained a judgment against the defendants for $17 million after a jury trial. In affirming this decision, the appeals court had no difficulty finding that there was a
sufficiently close connection with a securities transaction to satisfy the jurisdictional r e q ~ i r e m e n t Rather,
.~~
the court focused
on the issue of loss causation, i.e., causation not merely in inducing the plaintiff to enter into the transaction, but causation of
Id. at 42.
Id. For the conclusion of the SEC litigation, see SEC Litigation Rel. No. 11318, 6
FED.SEC.L. REP. (CCH) 173,523 at C3, 398-13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1986).
801 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1986).
Id. at 20.
30
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the actual loss ~uffered.9~
Loss causation requires that the damage complained of be one of the foreseeable consequences of the
misrepresentati~n.~'The court held that loss causation was
shown, even though the misrepresentation did not relate to the
government securities, because:
although the misrepresentation in the present case did not go to the
investment characteristics of the underlying government securities and, under our holding in Drysdale, this was not required it did go
to the investment quulity of the repos since, presumably, [hlanufach e r s Hanover] would not have contracted with [DryEdale] to
purchase and sell government securities had [hlanufacturers Hanover]
known of the misrepresentation regarding [Drysdale's] finances, particularly given that the . . statements [by Arthur Andersen & Co.]
were in part a response to the financial community's concern regarding [Drysdale's] ~tability.3~

-

.

Rule lob-5 provides a cause of action for securities fraud
only; the rule does not redress injuries occasioned by other
forms of misconduct. Courts have had difliculty in distinguishing
securities fraud from other types of fraud in two areas: breach of
fiduciary duty claims (including corporate mismanagement) and
commercial transactions. In addition, a recent Second Circuit
case illustrates the difficulty in distinguishing two kinds of federal fraud - securities and ~ommodities.9~
Apart from the
court's statement in Chemical Bank that the involvement of securities must be more than incidental, the courts have provided
little guidance on how to determine, in borderline situations,
whether the alleged fraud occurred in a securities transaction.
Indeed, the cases repeatedly warn of the dangers of generalization and stress the need to decide the issue on a case-by-case
basis.37
Set forth below is an analysis of other recent Second Circuit
opinions discussing the "in connection with" requirement, divided into breach of duty, commercial transactions, and com-

" Id.

" Id. at 20-21.

Id. at 2 2
See Saxe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 789 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 19%). See t a t accompanying notes 70-71 infra.
E.g.,Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579,595 (5th Cir. 1974).
sa
SB
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modities fraud categories. In some instances, the courts found
that no securities transaction had taken place at all. In others,
the securities transaction was distant in time to the alleged misconduct. In still others, the securities transaction was an insignificant part of the conduct that was the basis of the complaint.
In all three situations the fraud alleged was not deemed to be
securities fraud.

A. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Claims involving breach of fiduciary duty accompanied by
material misstatements where the connection between the fraud
and the securities transaction is remote should not be actionable
under Rule 10b-5.38Yet a number of significant cases evidence
the continuing difficulty in drawing the line between commonlaw breach of duty claims and federal securities fraud claims. In
some of these cases, the courts have found that, while there are
securities involved in the alleged fraud, there is no "purchase or
sale." Thus, a claim based on theft or conversion of securities is
not recognizable under. Rule lob-5.
Pross u. KatzS9illustrates the Second Circuit's refusal to allow a plaintiff to recast breach of fiduciary duty claims into federal securities claims. Over an eight-year period, the plaintiff
purchased a number of limited partnership interests in real estate ventures at the defendant's urging. Later, the defendant allegedly committed various fraudulent acts that divested the
plaintiff of his ownership interest in the investments. The court
did not discuss specifically the nature of the plaintiffs divestment of his ownership interest, and it did not ever consider that
the divestment itself could be the basis for federal jurisdiction.
Instead, the Second Circuit emphatically stated that "the comJ8 This is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S.462 (1977). In Santa Fe Industries, minority shareholders challenged, as
fraud under Rule lob-5, a short-form merger between the majority shareholder of the
corporation, which allegedly accomplished a freezeout of the minority shareholders at an
inadequate price. In holding that claims under Rule lob-5 require more than a showing
of corporate misconduct, rather, that they require a showing of manipulative or deceptive conduct, the Supreme Court expressed concern about extending Rule lob-5 jurisdiction over "a wide variety of corporate conduct traditionally left to state regulation," Id.
a t 478-79. The Court expressed fear that such an extension of the federal securities laws
would result in an increase in unnecessary and vexatious litigation in the federal courts,
as well as inappropriate interference with state-law regulation. Id. a t 478-79.
sB 784 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1986).
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plaint here alleges no more than a conversion of property that
happened to involve securities. We are unwilling to extend the
reach of the securities law to every conversion or theft of
The Supreme Court's opinion in Bankers Lifed1is, of course,
the leading case on drawing the line between breach of fiduciary
duty and securities fraud by reason of the "in connection with"
requirement and affords an instructive contrast with Pross. In
Bankers Life, the Second Circuit had affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it stated
nothing more than breach of fiduciary duty. The Second Circuit
stated that "there is a structural difference between the sale of
the corporation's bonds at a concededly fair price and the subsequent fraudulent misappropriation of the proceeds re~eived."'~
Thus, the Second Circuit found that where the plaintiff alleged
theft, albeit theft of the proceeds of stock sales, the securities
transaction mas incidental to the fraud. The corporation would
have suffered the same injury if the defendants had misappropriated the proceeds of a sale of any other property. The Supreme Court, however, took the view that where the link between the securities sale and the fraud is close in time and
where the sale is crucial to the fraud, the securities transaction
is not merely incidental to the fraud, and, therefore, there is jurisdiction under Rule 10b-5.'s Thus, while under Bankers Life, a
conventional sale of securities followed by misappropriation of
the proceeds is fraud in connection with a securities transaction,
under Pross, the ore direct conversion or theft of securities is
not securities fraud because of the absence of a securities
transaction.
The distinction between a sale of stock, followed by conversion of the proceeds, and conversion of the stock itself is a fine
one, but it is one that can be justified as necessary, after Bankers Life, to establish the boundary between common-law fraud
Id. at 459. In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has held tbnt a brokernge firm'e c p ~ a sional liquidation of a customer's securities account to finance unauthorized trade3 in ita
commodities account made out a Rule lob-5 claim, "in light of the broad interpretation
that courts lend to the 'in connection with' requirement" Smoky Greenhnw Cotton Co.
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc, 785 F.2d 1274, 1277 (5th Cir. 1986).
" 404 U.S. 6 (1971). The facts are summarized at n o b 5 supra.
430 F.2d 355,360 (2d Ci.1970).
4S Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 12.
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and securities fra~d.'~Some district courts in the Second Circuit, however, have obliterated that distinction and have in effect overruled Bankers Life by relying on Chemical Bank. Curiously, these cases involved customers' complaints against
brokers for alleged misconduct in the handling of their accounts.
Although the connection between the fraud and the trading process makes a securities fraud claim appropriate, these courts
have ruled that the complaints state only common-law claims.
In Crummere v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. Inc.,'=
the plaintiff charged that her broker persuaded her to sell off
some securities and then converted the proceeds. Without citing
Bankers Life, the district court dismissed the complaint, treating it as a simple conversion claim. Moreover, it held that misstatements made by the broker to conceal the fraud were not a
basis for jurisdiction under Rule lob-5, because the court read
Chemical Bank as requiring that the misstatements relate to
specific sec~rities."~
Similarly, in Moran v. Kidder Peabody &
Co.," the district court dismissed a customer's Rule lob-5 claim
against his broker for unauthorized trading in his account, stating that "[wlhether or not a broker faithfully performs a customer's orders is an agency questi~n."'~The trend in the district
courts to dismiss actions against brokers in reliance on Chemical
Bank has continued, despite the fact that the Second Circuit
made it clear in Drysdale that misrepresentations need not pertain to the securities them~elves.'~
44 Cf. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001,1014 n.26 (2d Cir. 1975): "[a] line must bo
drawn somewhere . . . .
4B Crummere v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. Inc., 624 F. Supp. 751
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). See also Bosio v. Norbay Sec., Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1563, 1567-68
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) ("bootstrapping" of a conversion claim not permitted). In contrast, tho
Sixth Circuit has held that a brokerage firm's wrongful refusal to return plaintiff's bonds,
which had been pledged as collateral, made out a Rule lob-5 claim. Mansbnch v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979).
Crummere, 624 F. Supp. a t 755.
" 617 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Contra Jaksich v. Thomson McKinnon Sec.,
582 F. Supp. 485,494 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (where achievement of a fraud is directly related
to the trading process, the "in connection with" requirement is met).
617 F. Supp. a t 1068. See also Schwartz v. Gordon, 761 F.2d 864,869-70 (2d Cir.
1985) (request to amend complaint to state a Rule lob-5 claim against broker for unauthorized investment of Keogh funds in high risk bonds denied); Baum v. Phillips, Appol
& Walden, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1518, 1526 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (unauthorized trading by
broker does not state a Rule lob-5 claim).
'@
See, e.g., Nevitsky v. Manufacturers Hanover Brokerage Serv., 654 F. Supp. 116,
119 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("a misrepresentation concerning the mechanics of a securities
9,
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As an alternative to finding no "purchase or sale" as a
means of limiting the scope of the federal securities laws, courts
may find the requisite connection too remote where the
purchase or sale was either distant in time to the fraud or an
insignificant aspect of the fraud.OO For example, in Bloor u.
Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & FassP1 the plaintiff, the
reorganization trustee for Investors Funding Corporation of New
York (IFC),alleged that corporate management mismanaged
and converted proceeds from the sale of stock. Without deciding
the question, the court expressed doubt as to whether there was
an "adequate connection" between the securities sales and any
damage suffered by IFC.62Since every corporation issues stock,
allowing the plaints to trace the proceeds to an act of mismanagement could inappropriately convert every state-law derivative claim of corporate mismanagement into a federal securities
claim. Furthermore, since every act of corporate mismanagement
would adversely affect the stock's market value, an overly broad
interpretation of the "touch" test would encompass all these
claims brought by traders in the stock as wellPs
The district court's decisions in the IF'C litigationM illustrate the ditliculties in formulating workable principles. The distransaction, without particular regard to the nature of the securities themwlvg is not
actionable under section 10(b)."); Bochicchio v. Smith Barney (1986-81 T m f e r Binder]
FED.SEC.L REP.(CCH) U 93,024 a t 95,118 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.. 17, 1986). In contrast, the
Third and Ninth Circuits have held that a broker's misrepresentations n h u t the
in
buying stock on margin make out a Rule lob-5 claim. See Angehtro v. PrudentinlBache Sec, Inc, 764 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1985); Arrington v. hlerrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, 651 F.2d 615 (9th Ci. 1981).
For an excellent example of a situation where the securities tmnmction r.m an
insignificant part of the transaction, see Head v. Head, 759 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1985). In
Head, the defendant's former wife unsuccessfully attempted to challenge their property
settlement agreement on securities fraud grounds. The only securities involved in the
transaction were defendant's shares of hi closely-held corporation, which had been
placed in escrow to secure payment of hi obligations to the plnintiff. The defendant
duly satisfied the obligation, the stock was returned to him,and i t was s u h u e n t l y sold
for $45 million. Not surprisingly, the Fourth Circuit found no connection betseen the
pledge of stock and any alleged fraud.
"l 754 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985).
62 Id. a t 61. Accord Rochelle v. hfarine hlidland Grace Trust Co., 535 F.2d 523,529
(9th Cir. 1976) ("[tlhe nexus between the securities transaction and the d e e d I r m
due to mismanagement is too attenuated in this case to use as a predicate for section
10(b) liability").
OS Natowitz v. Mehlman, 567 F. Supp. 942, 946 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
I n re Investors Funding Corp. Litig., 523 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); 568 F.
Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).

~~
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trict court drew a distinction between the trustee's claims based
on looting of the proceeds and those based on improvident investing of the proceeds. While the former claims might meet the
"in connection with" requirement on the basis of Bankers Life,
the latter did not, since they were precisely the kind of corporate mismanagement and breach of fiduciary duty claims that
are regulated by state law.66
Similarly, in Pross v. K a t ~ , 6the
~ court refused to find a link
between the plaintiffs purchases of the limited partnership interests and the subsequent fraud that was close enough to meet
the "in connection with" requirement. The court found that:
[a]n intent to cause a conversion of ownership interests at some uncertain future time and through uncertain means does not bring federal law into play, even though that intent is held at the time a
purchase or sale of securities occurs. The steps to be taken to effectuate the fraud are not integral to the purchase and sale of the securities
in question and are to occur only well after the securities transaction
has been completed. Other transactions or events may intervene and
cause the plan to be abandonedP7

On the other hand, the. court noted that if the original sale to
the plaintiff had involved conduct that facilitated the later
fraud, then the requisite connection would have been present.
"We believe a securities transaction that entails as one of its integral steps the fraudulent securing of blank signature pages for
purposes of a later conversion alleges a fraud 'in connection
with' the purchase or sale of securitie~."~~
In contrast to the above-mentioned breach of duty claims,
in the insider trading area, the Second Circuit has continued to
refuse to characterize misappropriation of confidential information for illicit stock gains as merely a breach of fiduciary duty.
~ Second Circuit summarily
In United States v. C a r ~ e n t e r :the
rejected as "frivolous" the defendant's contention that his misconduct was not connected with securities transactions. The defendant, a columnist for the Wall Street Journal, was convicted
of misappropriating information about the timing and content of
certain columns, as a participant in a trading ring that traded on
OD

as

523 F. Supp. at 538-39.
784 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1986).
Id. at 459.
Id.
791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986).
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the information in advance of its publication. The Second Circuit thus followed its 1981 decision in United States u. Mewman,sOwhere the lack of connection argument was quickly rejected, "since appellee's sole purpose in participating in the
misappropriation of confidential takeover information was to
purchase shares of the target ~ornpanies."~'
It is not possible to generalize on the requisite closeness of
the connection between the misconduct and the securities transaction, except to say that the securities transaction must be
more than incidental to the fraud, or as one court phrased it, the
securities transaction must be "an integral or helpful component" of the fraud.62The limitless possibilities of fact variations
that might make the securities transaction more or less remote
from the alleged fraud explain why the courts feel incapable of
deciding the cases except upon specific facts.0g

B. Commercial Transactions
The distinction between a securities investment and a commercial loan is a continuing difficulty, as the treatment of notes
664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981). cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
Id. a t 18.
Natowitz v. hfehlman, 567 F. Supp. 942, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
" The most significant case outside the Second Circuit d s w i n g both the "in connection with" and causation requirements is Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir.
1977). Plaintiffs, the majority shareholders, directors and former officers of n dose corporation, sued the other shareholders, directors and officers, chargbg thnt the defendnnb
schemed to oust them from their officerships. A shareholders' agreement provided thnt
only employees of the corporation could be shareholders and set forth n formuln for the
purchase price of the shares upon termination of employment. The Third Ciueuit, in
affirming the district court's dismissal of the complaint, first held thnt tho "in connection
with" requirement was not met. What was alleged was b a s i d y nn inh-corporata dispute over management; the plaintifs' basic grievance wns the terminntion of their officerships. hforeover, the Third Circuit also held that the requisite cowtion p;ns m h ing. There were a number of intervening steps between the fraud ond the d e of
securities, and the defendant's scheme was undertaken to oust the plaintiff8 as officers,
not to bring about the surrender of their stock. Thus, the securitia trnnsnction r ; only
~
an indirect consequence of the fraud.
The Fifth Circuit later distinguished Ketchum in Brown V. Ivie, 661 F.2d 62 (5th
Cir. 1981). In Brown, the plaintiff was ousted from his officership by the defendnnts nnd
required to sell hi shares under a shareholders' agreement. Unlike Ketchum, hsc;ever,
the Fifth Circuit found a direct connection between the fraud nnd the &ti=
tmnsnction. In Brown, the defendants, by reason of their ownership of n mnjority of the st&,
did not have to use fraud to oust the plaintiff from his office. They did, ho~ever,deceive
him into signing a second shareholders' agreement, since the originnl one nas invnlid,
and so the fraud was effected to divest h i of his s h e s .
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under the federal securities laws demonstrate^.^' The Chemical
Banke6 and the Drysdale Securities C ~ r pcases
. ~ ~explore this
dichotomy in the context of the "in connection with" requirement. Thus, Judge Friendly's holding in Chemical Bank rested
on his belief that the transaction involved a commercial loan,
which happened to include a pledge of s e ~ u r i t i e sOn
. ~ ~the other
hand, the court, by the time of the second Drysdale decision,
was convinced that a transaction involving repos was a securities
transaction.
Rand u. Anaconda-Ericsson, I ~ C .is~ an
* excellent example
of a plaintiffs attempt to convert allegations of "purely" commercial fraud into securities fraud, which the court properly
thwarted. Shareholders of Teltronics, a bankrupt corporation,
sued one of its creditors alleging 'that the defendant's press release, which stated that Teltronics was in default under a loan
agreement, ultimately led to Teltronics' bankruptcy and the
"forced sale" of the shareholders' stock. Even if the "forced
sale" had constituted a securities transaction, and the court held
that it did not, it is hard to see any connection between the
press release and the forced sale, except that the press release
started a chain of events that eventually led to the bankruptcy
of the corporation. This in no way sounds like the kind of fraud
that Rule lob-5 is intended to cover. In Chemical Bank, the
pledge of securities as an incidental part of a loan transaction
Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 19761, cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 884 (19861, provides an extensive discussion of the definitional issue,
including the various tests applied by the courts. The Touche court suggested that where
a note does not bear a resemblance to a typical "mercantile" transaction and has a maturity exceeding nine months, it should be deemed a security governed by the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Id. a t 1138. The test applied by the Fifth Circuit was whether tho
note was "issued in the context of a commercial loan transaction." 544 F.2d a t 1135
(citing Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank of Hereford, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974). The Tenth
Circuit test is whether the notes were to mature in less than nine months. Id. a t 1134
(citing Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 550-52 (10th Cir. 1974). The Ninth Circuit test
appears to be whether the issuer has superior access to and control of information material to the investment decision. Id. a t 1136 (citing Great Western Bank & Trust v. Katz,
532 F.2d 1252, 1261 (9th Cir. 1976) (E. Wright, concurring).
eD See notes 17-23 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 21-32 and accompanying text supra.
Judge Friendly contrasted the facts in Chemical Bank with those in Weaver v.
Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 455 U.S.551 (1982).
In Weaver, misrepresentations led to the pledge, while in Chemical Bank, misrepresentations led to a loan secured by a pledge. Chemical Bank, 726 F.2d a t 944.
794 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1986).
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was not sufficient to transform a commercial transaction into a
securities transaction. Similarly, in Rand, alleged misstatements
made in a commercial transaction would not give rise to a securities fraud claim, even if the misstatements had eventually
brought about a "forced sale." It is significant that in each case
the only securities transaction alleged was an atypical one: a
pledge and a liquidation.
A more difficult case is Bennett v. United States k t Co.
of New Y ~ r kIn. ~
Bennett;
~
a bank lent money to the plaintiffs
for the purchase of securities and allegedly made misrepresentations about the margin requirements. While the Second Circuit
treated this case as a loss-causation case, it is more properly analyzed as a case involving a commercial transaction. Even
though the bank allegedly made misstatements about the margin requirements applicable to the securities, the plaintiffs' use
of the loan proceeds to purchase securities can be viewed as peripheral to the loan transaction because the bank did not induce
the plaintiffs to purchase the securities.
There is less difficulty in applying the "in connection with"
requirement in the commercial area than in the breach of duty
area. The distinction between a commercial transaction and a
securities transaction is generally d r a m by determining whether
a "security" is present, which involves distinguishing commercial
notes from investment notes. In drawing the distinction between
a breach of duty claim and a securities fraud claim, on the other
hand, the inquiry focuses on the degree of the connection between the wrong and the securities transaction, since these situations typically involve an undisputed security.
C. Commodities Fraud
As investors continue to diversify their investments, jurisdictional disputes over the nature of the alleged fraud can be
expected. Saxe v. E.F.Hutton & CO.?Ois an excellent example of
this difficulty. The plaintiff sued both a securities and a commodities firm, charging that he was induced by fraudulent misstatements about the commodities advisor and his trading program to liquidate his stock portfolio and invest those funds into
770 F.2d 308 (2d Ci.1985).
789 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
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a commodities account. The Second Circuit found that no claim
was stated under Rule lob-5, since the sale of the securities was
merely incidental to any fraud that may have occurred in the
reinvestment of these funds in the commodities account. Since
all the misrepresentations related to the commodities futures investments program, there was no fraud "in connection with" a
securities transaction. At best, only the "but-for" causation
found insufficient in Chemical Bank was present here. Indeed,
since, according to the complaint, the plaintiff had already determined to close out his stock portfolio, even "but-for" causation was absent. The plaintiff stated a federal claim, but the
claim was for fraud under the Commodities Exchange Act, not
the Securities Exchange Act.71

In.

LOSS

CAUSATION

The requirement of loss causation derives from the tort concept of proximate causation. Loss causation serves to limit the
damages flowing from a securities fraud and " 'in effect requires
that the damage claimed be one of foreseeable consequences of
the misrepresentation.' "72 In Schlick u. Penn-Dixie Cement
C0rp.,7~the Second Circuit viewed the element of causation as
borrowed from common-law tort principles. In recent cases,
however, courts have viewed the causation requirement as an aspect of the "in connection with" req~irement.~'
In Schlick, the plaintiff, a minority shareholder of Continental Steel Corp., charged the defendant, the majority shareholder, with exercising its control over the corporation to defraud the minority shareholders. He alleged that Penn-Dixie
manipulated and depressed the market value of Continental's
stock in relation to Penn-Dixie's stock by using Continental's assets for the benefit of Penn-Dixie, and that Penn-Dixie then
caused Continental to enter into a merger agreement with PennDixie, at an unfair exchange ratio. In connection with the
71 Id. at 108-09. But see Smoky Greenhaw Cotton v. Merrill Lynch, 785 F.2d 1274
(5th Cir. 1986), discussed at note 40 supra.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Drysdale Securities, 801 F.2d at 20-21 (quoting Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1980)).
7s 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974).
See, e.g., Nevitsky v. Manufacturers Hanover Brokerage Sew., 654 F. Supp. 116,
119 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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merger, Penn-Dixie issued a proxy statement that failed to dhclose how Penn-Dixie had inflated the value of its shares.
In Schlick, the Second Circuit distinguished between Rule
lob-5 claims based on misrepresentations and omissions, on the
one hand, and those based on a more comprehensive fraudulent
scheme, on the other. The court held that where the Rule lob-5
claim is based solely on material misrepresentations or omissions, there must be a showing of both loss causation - that the
misstatements caused the economic harm - and transaction
causation - that the misstatements caused the plaintiff to engage in the securities transaction. The court held that loss causation was demonstrated by proof of some form of economic
damage - in Schlick, the unfair exchange ratio. Transaction
causation, however, required substantially more. In a case involving misrepresentations, the plaintiff must establish reliance.
In a case involving omissions, the plaintiff must establish the
materiality of the undisclosed facts. However, proof of transaction causation was deemed to be unnecessary where, as in
Schlick the plaints alleges a fraudulent scheme including more
than misstatements; in these cases, loss causation is sufli~ient.?~
In Chemical Bank, transaction causation could be proved:
the banks could establish that they relied on the misrepresentations, and that the omissions were material, by establishing that
had they knom the truth about Frigitemp's financial condition,
they would not have made the loan, including the pledge of
stock. Nevertheless, Judge Friendly said, while this "but for"
causation established transaction causation, it was not suilicient
to establish loss causation because there was no economic damage resulting from the pledge.?6
In the simplest Rule lob-5 claim, where, for example, a purchaser of securities claims that he paid too much because of misrepresentations overstating the value of the stock, the dual requirements of loss and transaction causation are easily satisfied.
In transactions which are indisputably securities transactions,
economic damage resulting from the transaction is easily proved;
the stock was not worth what the purchaser paid. Because the
misrepresentation relates to the investment quality of the security, reliance is usually not an issue. In situations like Chemical
Id. at 380-81.
726 F.2d at 943-44.
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Bank, however, where the securities transaction is incidental to
the overall transaction, even though the plaintiff can establish
transaction causation - that he would have acted differently
had he known the truth - what he would have done differently
is not enter into a loan transaction. Accordingly, plaintiffs cannot establish loss causation, because the economic damage results from a bad loan, not from the stock pledge. As the court
stated in Drysdale, "[tlhe standard for liability in a civil action
under section 10(b) is causation not merely in inducing the
plaintiff to enter into a transaction or series of transactions, but
causation of the actual loss suffered."77
Thus, in situations where there is no doubt that there is a
securities transaction, courts may take a more relaxed view of
the causation requirement, as illustrated in the pre-Chemical
n ~Com~
Bank opinions, Marbury Management, Inc. v. K ~ h and
petitive Associates, Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath &
H o r ~ a t hOn
.~~
the other hand, where it is a close question as to
whether there is federal securities jurisdiction, the court may focus on the causation issue and require a closer relationship between the misstatement and the economic harm, as by insisting
that the misstatement relate to the investment characteristics of
the security. This is the approach taken in Chemical Bank and
Bloor u. Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & F a ~ s . ~ ~
In Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn,sl the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs could recover for losses incurred on
securities purchased on the defendant's recommendations. The
defendant, a trainee at a brokerage firm, had told the plaintiffs
that he was a stock broker and a "portfolio management specialist." The trial court found that there was no fraud with respect
to his recommendations. Nevertheless, since the plaintiffs purchased the securities and held on to them while their market
value declined because of their belief that the defendant was an
expert, their losses were proximately caused by the defendant's

77

Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 801 F.2d 13, 20 (2d Cir.

1986).

" 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980). See text accompanying notes 81-83 infra.
so

516 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1975). See text accompanying notes 84-85 infra.
754 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985). See text accompanying notes 51-55 supra & 86-90

infra.
629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980).
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misrepresentation^.^^ The majority opinion denied that the de-

cline in the market value of the securities was an intervening
event breaking the chain of causation:
Differentiating transaction causation from loss causation can be a
helpful analytical procedure only so long as it does not become n new
rule effectively limiting recovery for fraudulently induced securities
transactions to instances of fraudulent representations about the
value characteristics of the securities dealt in. So concise a theory of
liabiity for fraud would be too accommodative of many common
types of fraud, such as the misrepresentation of a collateral fact that
induces a transacti~n.~~

In Competitive Associates, Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein,
Horwath & Horwath,B4a mutual fund charged that the defendant, an accounting firm, knowingly certified the false financial
statements of a private investment fund managed by one
Yamada, in order to induce the plaintiff to hire Yamada to manage part of its portfolio, in a scheme to facilitate Yamada's stock
manipulation. As a result, the plaintiff lost several million dollars because of Yamada's unlawful securities transactions. Reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment for the
defendants, the Second Circuit emphasized that the ''plaintiff
here alleges that the accountants accepted payoffs and otherwise
actively collaborated with Yamada for the specific purpose of influencing investors to authorize Yamada to carry out security
transactions on its behalf."86
Competitive Associates provides a useful comparison with
the Chemical Bank and Drysdale Securities cases. In Chemical
Bank, misrepresentations about Frigitemp simply did not cause
the banks to suffer any injury from the stock pledge, whereas in
Competitive Associates, misrepresentations about Yamada's investment company caused the mutual fund to suffer losses from
his stock manipulation. Moreover, just as in Competitive Associates, the accountants could foresee (in fact, they intended) the
resulting injury, so, in the Drysdale cases, the accountants could
foresee the resulting injury. The accountants certified Drysdale's
financial condition when the marketplace was expressing con-

LU

Id. at 708.
Id. at 710 n.3.
516 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1975).
Id. at 815.
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cern over the firm's financial condition; indeed, the financial
statements were furnished to provide assurance on this point.
While Marbury Management and Competitive Associates
lessen the significance of loss causation as an independent element in a Rule lob-5 claim, they do so in cases where there is no
question that the damages resulted from securities transactions,
and where the foreseeability of the particular damage suffered is
apparent. Chemical Bank does not overrule these cases and insist that loss causation be established only by misrepresentations that relate to the investment characteristics of the
securities.
The Second Circuit's decision in Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock,
Londin, Rodman & Fussss is another illustration of the court's
recognition that the "in connection with" and causation requirements are related. ,The trustee for IFC sued the attorneys who
prepared IFC's registration statements and other disclosure documents that allegedly misstated or omitted information about
corporate mismanagement and looting. The court expressed
doubt that the "in connection with" requirement was met, but
found it unnecessary to decide this question, since the trustee
failed to show that the law firm's alleged misconduct caused injury to the corporation. The mismanagement and looting of the
proceeds from the stock sales was not a direct or foreseeable result of the law firm's a c t i v i t i e ~ . ~ ~
The lower court opinions in the IFC litigation provide more
extensive analysis of both the "in connection with" and causa~ ~discussed previously, the district court
tion r e q ~ i r e m e n t s .As
determined that the looting charges met the "in connection
with" requirement, but the mismanagement charges did not.aDIn
the looting charges brought against the corporate officers and
another individual who actively participated in the fraud, the
court found that causation was established, but causation was
lacking where the defendants were the accounting firm and the
lawyersg0and the alleged misconduct was recklessness in preparing the disclosure documents.
754 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985). See notes 51-55 and accompanying text supra.
Id. at 62.
See In re Investors Funding Corp. Sec. Litig., 523 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
566 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
566 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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Two other post-Chemical Bank district court opinions illustrate the diiliculties that courts are having with the issue of loss
causation. In First Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co.,8l the plaintiffs were former customers of Comark, a now insolvent dealer in government securities. Securities purchased for the plaintiffs were left with the
dealer for safekeeping, and Comark represented that the securities would be segregated from its o m securities. The clearing
agent for Comark made overnight loans that, notwithstanding
the dealer's representations, were secured by the plaintiffs' securities. When the dealer became insolvent, the clearing agent
liquidated the plaintiffs' securities. The plaintiffs alleged that
the defendant accounting firm knew about Cornark's financial
problems'and the fact that it had pledged the customers' securities and fraudulently misrepresented this information. The court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the Rule lob-5 claim
as to primary liabiliW2
Although expressing some uncertainty, the court a t least
tentatively concluded that the "in connection with" requirement
was met on the basis of Bankers Life,since Oppenheim, Appel,
Dixon & Co.'s (OAD's) fraudulent misrepresentations, which induced the subsequent securities purchases, were nearly contemporaneous with the dealer's conversion of the securities.DgOn the
question of loss causation, the court distinguished this case from
Chemical Bank:
OAD's alleged misrepresentationsdid not relate only to the financial condition of Comark, with a securities transaction occupying only
an incidental place in a larger fraudulently induced transaction.
Rather, the amended complaint alleges that the misrepresentations
went to the very fraud that later resulted in the loss of plainti&' securities, and the direct purchases of securities from Comark comtituted the entire fraudulently induced transa~tion.~

Nevertheless, the court concluded that "the separation between
the purchases and the harm is too great to support a cause of
action for securities fraud, a t least as to OAD's primary liabil29 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y.1986).
Id. at 442.
as Id. at 441.
Id. at 441-42.

ax
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ity."06 The court reached this conclusion because the plaintiffs
were not injured by the securities purchases, but by the pledge
of the securities to the clearing agent.s6
This decision appears wrongly decided in light of the complaint's allegations that the accountants knowingly participated
in the fraud. The court, however, refused to dismiss the complaint against the defendant on a theory of aiding and abetting
the securities fraud committed by the dealer, so it appears that
the plaintiffs have another road to the same destination.
Finally, in Kimmco Energy Corp. u. Jones,'" the plaintiffs
were also unsuccessful in establishing loss causation. They had
invested in two partnerships managed by the defendant. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant misrepresented a number of
significant facts about the activities of the first partnership, the
apparent success of which led them to invest in the second partnership. In granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the Rule
lob-5 claim, the court found that the plaintiffs' allegations were
inadequate to establish loss causation. It noted that while the
plaintiffs established transaction causation by their allegations
that the misrepresentations about the first partnership induced
them to invest in the second, there were no allegations that the
defendant was aware, at the time of the misrepresentations, that
a second partnership would be formed. Thus, there was nothing
to show that the securities transaction was a foreseeable consequence of the mis~tatements.~~

It is clear, after Chemical Bank, that the securities transaction must have a more than incidental involvement with the alleged misconduct to satisfy the "in connection with" requirement for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction under Rule
10b15. The Drysdale opinions make it clear that loss causation
does not require that misrepresentations made in a securities
transaction relate to the investment characteristics of the spe-

g5

se

Id. at 442.
Id.
603 F. Supp. 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
Id. at 766-67.
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cific securities. Rather, the test remains the same - proximate
cause, - and the determination of this will continue to be made,
necessarily, on a case-by-case basis.
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